⚠ The Electric QuestionHigh threat

Ferrari (RACE) — threat to the moat

Ferrari has committed to an electric car and already halved its own target for them, which is either commendable honesty or an admission that the engine was load-bearing.

Ferrari has committed to selling an electric car, and nobody knows whether the thing that makes a Ferrari a Ferrari survives the transition.

The 2030 line-up, before and after the revision (% of models)20%Combustionold plan40%Combustionnew plan40%Hybrid old plan40%Hybrid new plan40%Electric old plan20%Electric new planOctober 2025 Capital Markets Day. Electric halved; combustion doubled.
Ferrari built an electric car, showed it, and cut its own 2030 target for the category in half. Deliveries begin late 2026.

The plan is now explicit and it has already been walked back once. At the Capital Markets Day in October 2025 Ferrari set a 2030 line-up of roughly 40% internal combustion, 40% hybrid and 20% electric — a materially smaller electric share than the 40% it had previously indicated — and revealed the production chassis and powertrain of the car then called the Ferrari elettrica, named the Ferrari Luce in February 2026 on a three-phase launch still to be completed.1 The shares fell as much as 16.18% that day, their steepest drop since the 2016 listing, erasing about €13.5 billion of market value.2

The commercial question is not range or cost. It is that a meaningful part of what a Ferrari client is buying is a naturally aspirated or turbocharged engine making a specific noise, and no electric powertrain reproduces it. Ferrari's own risk factors put the exposure plainly: electric technology is a core component of the strategy, and if its introduction proves too costly or unsuccessful in the market, results could be materially adversely affected.3 The same section notes that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it.4

There is a second-order risk in the residual values that underpin the whole model. Ferrari argues that the resilience of its cars' value after ownership promotes repeat purchases — and warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may hurt residuals if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars.5 The waiting list works because a Ferrari holds its value. An electric Ferrari that does not would erode the mechanism, not just the model.

Watch the order book on the Luce specifically, not total shipments. Ferrari allocates by waiting list, so a model nobody queues for is visible long before it is visible in revenue.

The number that tests this threat
Reported
Revenue exposed to the powertrain transition
84% — €6,005M of cars and spare parts

Everything except the €820M brand line and €321M of other revenue. Ferrari has committed to an electric car, halved its own 2030 target for the category, and warns in the same filing that if the introduction of electric technology proves too costly or unsuccessful in the market its results could be materially adversely affected — and separately that hybrid and electric models may sell at wider secondary-market discounts, which would erode the residual-value loop the whole waiting list rests on. Watch the order book on the Luce specifically, not total shipments: Ferrari allocates by waiting list, so a model nobody queues for is visible long before it reaches revenue.

Source: Ferrari Form 20-F, FY2025 ↗
References
  1. ReportedAt the Capital Markets Day in October 2025 Ferrari set a 2030 line-up of roughly 40% internal combustion, 40% hybrid and 20% electric — a materially smaller electric share than the 40% it had previously indicated — and revealed the production chassis and powertrain of the car then called the Ferrari elettrica, named the Ferrari Luce in February 2026 on a three-phase launch still to be completed...
    Reporting on the market reaction to Ferrari Capital Markets Day, 9 October 2025. Ferrari cut its 2030 fully electric target to 20% of production, from 40% in its 2022 plan, with hybrids and combustion models each accounting for 40%. The shares fell as much as 16.18% to EUR350.80, their steepest drop since the company listed in Milan in 2016, erasing about EUR13.5 billion of market value, as investors reacted to lower-than-expected financial targets and the reduced electric-vehicle plan. — October 2025 · publ. 2025-10-09 · source ↗
  2. ReportedThe shares fell as much as 16.18% that day, their steepest drop since the 2016 listing, erasing about €13.5 billion of market value. The commercial question is not range or cost.
    Reporting on the market reaction to Ferrari Capital Markets Day, 9 October 2025. Ferrari cut its 2030 fully electric target to 20% of production, from 40% in its 2022 plan, with hybrids and combustion models each accounting for 40%. The shares fell as much as 16.18% to EUR350.80, their steepest drop since the company listed in Milan in 2016, erasing about EUR13.5 billion of market value, as investors reacted to lower-than-expected financial targets and the reduced electric-vehicle plan. — October 2025 · publ. 2025-10-09 · source ↗
  3. ReportedFerrari's own risk factors put the exposure plainly: electric technology is a core component of the strategy, and if its introduction proves too costly or unsuccessful in the market, results could be materially adversely affected. The same section notes that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it.
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
  4. ReportedThe same section notes that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it. There is a second-order risk in the residual values that underpin the whole model.
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
  5. ReportedFerrari argues that the resilience of its cars' value after ownership promotes repeat purchases — and warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may hurt residuals if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. The waiting list works because a Ferrari holds its value.
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
Sources
Generated September 23, 2026