The Customer Who Stopped Trading UpThin moat

Dino Polska (DNP) — moat facet

In 2026 Dino's shoppers turned price-sensitive together, and the company chose to keep the volume and pay for it in margin.

The second quarter of 2026 is the clearest picture of Dino's customer the company has ever published.

June 2026 quarter: what the customer did+10,5%Revenue growth+0,3%Like-for-like-0,56ppEBITDA margin changeDino chose to hold volume and pay for it in margin.
A retailer with pricing power would have held margin and taken lower volume. Dino did the reverse.

Like-for-like sales grew 0,3%1. Revenue grew 10,5% on the strength of 341 new stores2. The EBITDA margin fell from 7,54% to 6,98%3. Read together, those say the existing customer base bought roughly the same quantity of groceries as a year earlier, and Dino gave up price to make sure of it.

Management's account is deflation in parts of the basket and consumers who became markedly more price-sensitive. That is consistent with the numbers and consistent with the wider market: discounters hold roughly 39% of Polish grocery spending precisely because Polish shoppers respond to price.

The word "trading" in the title is doing real work. Dino's customers did not leave; they bought the same things and declined to buy better ones. In a range of about five thousand items4 with fresh food at 41% of sales5, the mix effect lands hardest in exactly the categories Dino makes its money on.

The choice Dino made is defensible and revealing. A retailer with pricing power would have held margin and accepted slightly lower volume. Dino did the reverse, in a format whose fixed costs — owned buildings, a meat plant, 55,9 thousand staff6 — make lost volume expensive. Those costs are not merely large but rising: employee benefits up 21,2% and depreciation up 23,4% in 20257, against a customer who has stopped increasing what they spend.

The measure is the gap between revenue growth and like-for-like. Ten points of it, as in the June 2026 quarter, means the customer is contributing none of the growth.

Moat trajectory: Narrowing

Like-for-like went 4,4% for 2025, 2,2% for the first half of 2026 and 0,3% in the second quarter. The customer stopped contributing growth.

The number that tests this moat
Reported
Like-for-like sales growth
0,3% in the June 2026 quarter, from 4,4% for 2025

The single most important number Dino publishes. It strips out the new stores and reports what the existing estate did, and at 0,3% the answer is: nothing.

Source: Dino Polska Management Report for the first half of 2026 ↗
References
  1. ReportedLike-for-like sales grew 0,3%.
    Dino Polska Management Board's Activity Report for 2025 - Section 4,1-4,3, results of operations (sales revenue of 33 634,2m złoty up 14,9%, gross profit and the 23,5% gross margin, the cost lines including employee benefits up 21,2% and depreciation up 23,4%, EBITDA, and like-for-like growth of 4,4%) — FY2025 · publ. March 2026 · source ↗
  2. ReportedRevenue grew 10,5% on the strength of 341 new stores.
    Dino Polska Management Report for the first half of 2026 - 3 176 stores at 30 June 2026 (341 more than a year earlier), 86 openings in the second quarter, revenue of 9 531,4m złoty up 10,5%, like-for-like growth of 0,3% in the quarter and 2,2% for the half, and the EBITDA margin of 6,98% against 7,54% — H1 2026 · publ. August 2026 · source ↗
  3. ReportedThe EBITDA margin fell from 7,54% to 6,98%.
    Dino Polska Management Report for the first half of 2026 - 3 176 stores at 30 June 2026 (341 more than a year earlier), 86 openings in the second quarter, revenue of 9 531,4m złoty up 10,5%, like-for-like growth of 0,3% in the quarter and 2,2% for the half, and the EBITDA margin of 6,98% against 7,54% — H1 2026 · publ. August 2026 · source ↗
  4. ReportedIn a range of about five thousand items with fresh food at 41% of sales, the mix effect lands hardest in exactly the categories Dino makes its money on.
    Dino Polska Management Board's Activity Report for 2025 - Section 3,1, business profile (the standardised 400 m2 store format carrying roughly 5 000 stock keeping units, fresh food at 41% of sales delivered daily, the small-town and edge-of-town siting, the twelve distribution centres, and the ownership of most store real estate) — FY2025 · publ. March 2026 · source ↗
  5. ReportedIn a range of about five thousand items with fresh food at 41% of sales, the mix effect lands hardest in exactly the categories Dino makes its money on.
    Dino Polska Management Board's Activity Report for 2025 - Section 3,1, business profile (the standardised 400 m2 store format carrying roughly 5 000 stock keeping units, fresh food at 41% of sales delivered daily, the small-town and edge-of-town siting, the twelve distribution centres, and the ownership of most store real estate) — FY2025 · publ. March 2026 · source ↗
  6. ReportedDino did the reverse, in a format whose fixed costs — owned buildings, a meat plant, 55,9 thousand staff — make lost volume expensive.
    Dino Polska Management Board's Activity Report for 2025 - Section 3,2, description of the Group (Agro-Rydzyna, the wholly-owned meat processing plant at Kloda supplying the fresh counters, private label at 6,6% of network sales excluding its output, the eZebra internet business, and the direct sourcing arrangements with producers) — FY2025 · publ. March 2026 · source ↗
  7. ReportedThose costs are not merely large but rising: employee benefits up 21,2% and depreciation up 23,4% in 2025, against a customer who has stopped increasing what they spend.
    Dino Polska Management Board's Activity Report for 2025 - Section 4,1-4,3, results of operations (sales revenue of 33 634,2m złoty up 14,9%, gross profit and the 23,5% gross margin, the cost lines including employee benefits up 21,2% and depreciation up 23,4%, EBITDA, and like-for-like growth of 4,4%) — FY2025 · publ. March 2026 · source ↗
Sources
Generated September 24, 2026