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Major ClientsThin moat

Nvidia (NVDA) — moat facet

Two unnamed buyers are 36% of revenue, up from 23% a year earlier — and the famous names everyone assumes are Nvidia's customers mostly aren't, technically.

Nvidia's customer concentration is the most extreme in this collection, and it got dramatically worse in a single year. In fiscal 2026 one direct customer accounted for 22% of total revenue and another for 14% — 36% from two buyers1. A year earlier the largest was 12% and two others 11% each. Nvidia's own filing states plainly that revenue is concentrated among a limited number of customers and that the trend may continue.

Top-two direct customers, share of total revenue (%)13%FY202423%FY202536%FY2026FY2026: one customer at 22% and another at 14%; Nvidia says the trend may continue
The most extreme concentration in this collection, and it is intensifying — the exact inverse of Apple's page of the same name.

Then comes the quirk that makes this page worth reading. Nvidia does not name those customers, and they are probably not the companies you would guess. Its direct customers are largely the OEMs, ODMs, distributors and system integrators who assemble and resell the hardware. The famous names — the cloud providers, the neocloud builders, the model labs — are mostly indirect customers who buy through those channels, and Nvidia says it estimates some of them individually exceed 10% of revenue too.

Read through the channel and the real picture is this: hyperscalers supplied 55.9% of data-center revenue in the latest quarter, and over the past year the buyers who are not hyperscalers grew their purchases 195% against the hyperscalers' 71%2 — the rest spread across AI clouds, enterprises, sovereign projects and industry. Those are the buyers who matter, and the uncomfortable fact — treated in full on this company's root threat page — is that the four largest of them are each building accelerators of their own.

Set against Apple's page of the same name, the contrast is close to total: Apple has no customer worth naming and sells to hundreds of millions of individuals who cannot negotiate. Nvidia sells to a few dozen organisations that can negotiate, are building substitutes, and in several cases are financed by Nvidia itself. The pages that follow take the concentration, the channel, the hyperscalers and the labs in turn.

Moat trajectory: Narrowing

Concentration intensified sharply in one year — the top two direct customers went from about 23% of revenue to 36% — while the largest end buyers are all funding substitutes and a growing slice of demand comes from labs and neoclouds Nvidia has itself financed. Extraordinary revenue, resting on fewer and more conflicted counterparties than a year ago.

The number that tests this moat
Reported
Revenue from the top two direct customers
36% (22% + 14%), from 23%

The most extreme customer concentration in this collection, and it worsened sharply in one year — Nvidia's own filing says the trend may continue. Hyperscalers supply about half of data-center revenue through the channel. Watch the concentration lines each year: this is what converts an AI-demand wobble into an earnings shock.

Customer concentration is a 10-K/10-Q disclosure and the Form 10-Q for Q3 FY2027 had not been filed when this page was written, so this is the last filed figure.
Source: NVIDIA Form 10-K FY2026 ↗
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References
  1. ReportedFY2026: one direct customer at 22% of revenue and another at 14%, versus 12% and two at 11% a year earlier; NVIDIA states revenue is concentrated among a limited number of direct and indirect customers and estimates some indirect customers individually exceed 10%.
    NVIDIA Form 10-K, FY2026 — "For fiscal year 2026, sales to one direct customer represented 22% of total revenue and sales to another direct customer represented 14% of total revenue"; FY2025: one at 12% and two at 11% each; FY2024: one at 13%. Direct customers include OEMs, ODMs, distributors and system integrators; indirect customers (CSPs, Neocloud builders, AI model makers, enterprises, public sector) buy through them, and NVIDIA "estimate[s] some individually representing 10% or more of our revenue". "Our revenue is concentrated among a limited number of direct and indirect customers and this trend may continue." — FY2026 (ended Jan 25, 2026) · publ. February 2026 · source ↗
  2. ReportedHyperscalers supplied 55.9% of data-center revenue in the latest quarter, and over the past year the buyers who are not hyperscalers grew their purchases 195% against the hyperscalers' 71%.
    NVIDIA Q3 FY2027 CFO commentary (Form 8-K, exhibit 99.2) — Data Center revenue of $107.6 billion splits into Hyperscale $60.1 billion (up 71% year on year, up 23% sequentially) and AI Clouds, Industrial & Enterprise $47.5 billion (up 195%, up 18%), growth 'driven by the introduction of our Rubin infrastructure, our fastest architecture ramp ever, standalone Vera CPUs and the continued growth of Blackwell Ultra'; shipments of Data Center Hopper products to China during the quarter were $2.4 billion; Edge Computing $8.2 billion, up 42% and up 14% sequentially, as 'Strong Blackwell workstation sales and edge compute for Physical AI applications drove the increases, while higher memory and system prices continue to affect consumer PC demand'; reportable segments Compute & Networking $106.0 billion (up 108%) and Graphics $9.8 billion (up 62%); GAAP gross margin 74.8% against 75.0% in Q2 FY2027 and 73.4% in Q3 FY2026, higher year on year 'on improved mix from Blackwell Ultra' and down sequentially 'reflecting the initial Rubin ramp'; GAAP operating expenses up 57% year on year and 9% sequentially — Q3 FY2027 (quarter ended 25 October 2026) · publ. 2026-11-17 · source ↗
Sources
Generated November 18, 2026