The Commission EngineNarrow moat
Apple (AAPL) — moat facet
A 15-to-30% cut of other people's businesses, at nearly pure margin — one of the best economic positions in all of commerce.
The commission Apple takes on sales made through the App Store — historically around thirty percent, reduced to fifteen for smaller developers1 and for the later years of a subscription — is the mechanism that converts gatekeeping into profit, and it is a wonderful engine indeed. On a great deal of what changes hands inside the store, Apple simply takes its cut, and because the cost of running the store is small relative to the sums flowing through it2, the commission is extraordinarily high-margin. It is a large part of why the Services business is so profitable and so richly valued, and why Services gross margin rose from 55.0% in fiscal 2017 to 75.4% in fiscal 20254.
What makes the commission so attractive as a business is that it is paid for almost entirely by other people's effort and other people's risk. The developers build the apps, take the chances, and bear the costs of creating something people want; Apple built the road and the storefront and collects a percentage of the traffic between them. It is closer to a royalty on the labor of others than to a conventional product business, and royalties, requiring little incremental effort to grow, are among the finest economics there are.
The engine also scales beautifully. As more of economic life moves onto phones — as games, media, services, and commerce increasingly happen inside apps — the base on which Apple levies its commission grows without Apple having to do much of anything at all. The store handles more transactions, and the cut compounds, at very little added cost. A business that grows its take simply because the world it sits astride is growing occupies an enviable position.
The vulnerability, of course, is that the commission is precisely what everyone is fighting over. Developers resent it, regulators question it, and courts are pressing to lower it or to let developers avoid it by steering customers to outside payment methods. The commission is the richest strand of the whole franchise and therefore the most exposed — the number a legislator's pen could most directly reduce. But for now it remains a remarkably lucrative engine, humming along on the effort of a million developers3.
Narrowing. The commission — 30% headline, 15% for smaller developers and second-year subscriptions — is the mechanism that converts the install base into pure-margin Services revenue, and it is under direct attack. EU rules force alternative billing, and Apple has had to introduce reduced fee tiers to comply. Every carve-out, and every jurisdiction that follows, chips at the take rate. The engine still runs and still throws off enormous profit, but the rate it can charge is being ratcheted down, not up.
The commission is nearly pure margin, so Services gross margin rises as it grows. A year-on-year fall would be the first sign that lower rates or fee-free links were eating into the richest strand of the business.
Source: Apple Form 10-K, FY2025 ↗- ReportedHistorically ~30%, reduced to 15% for smaller developers and for subscriptions after the first year.Apple App Store — published commission schedule (15% small-business / subscriptions after year one; 30% standard) — Current schedule · publ. 2025–2026 · source ↗
- ReportedServices gross margin runs near ~75% — the store's costs are small relative to the sums flowing through it.Apple Inc., Form 10-Q (Products vs. Services gross margin disclosure) — Q2 FY2026 — quarter ended Mar 28, 2026 · publ. Filed May 2026 · source ↗
- ReportedServices revenue reached ~$109B in FY2025, of which the commission is one of the most profitable strands.Apple Inc., Form 10-K (FY2025) — Fiscal year ended Sep 27, 2025 · publ. Filed Oct 31, 2025 · source ↗
- ReportedServices gross margin rose from 55.0% in fiscal 2017 to 75.4% in fiscal 2025.Apple Inc., Form 10-K FY2019 — gross margin percentage: products 32.2% / 34.4% / 35.7% and services 63.7% / 60.8% / 55.0% for 2019 / 2018 / 2017; total 37.8%; total deferred revenue $8.1B; direct channels 31% — Fiscal year ended 28 September 2019 · publ. 31 October 2019 · source ↗
- Apple Form 10-K, FY2025 — Business & Risk Factors (SEC EDGAR)
- Apple Q2 FY2026 earnings call transcript (The Motley Fool)
- EU Digital Markets Act — official European Commission site